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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Appellee, Michael Aviano ("Mr. Aviano"), notes that the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
have failed to provide a citation to the record showing that their "Issues Presented for 
Review" was preserved in the trial court, as required by UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(A). 
However, in the event this Court is still willing to consider the Plaintiffs' appeal, Mr. 
Aviano submits the following as the issues which are presented for review: 
Whether the trial court was correct in holding that the Plaintiffs failed to plead 
fraud with particularity in their Second Amended Complaint against Mr. Aviano, thus 
providing the trial court with a sufficient basis for dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based 
causes of action? A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to UTAH R. Civ. 
P. 9(b) presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Coroles v. Sabey, 
2003 UT App 339,115, 79 P.3d 974. 
Whether the trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based causes of 
action without leave to amend when the Plaintiffs already had unsuccessfully attempted 
multiple times to plead fraud with particularity? A district court's decision to disallow a 
party leave to amend pleadings is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, 
Westley v. Farmer's Ins, Exchange, 663 P.3d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). Consequently, the trial 
court's decision will not be disturbed "absent a clear abuse of discretion." Coroles, 2003 
UT App 339, H 15. 
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Whether the trial court was correct in holding that Utah does not recognize causes 
of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting 
fraudulent non-disclosure, thus providing the trial court with a sufficient basis for 
dismissing said causes of action? A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant 
to UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
Helfv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11,114, 203 P.3d 962. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
UTAHR. ClV. P. 9(b): "Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of 
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other condition of the mind of a person may 
be averred generally." 
UTAH R. ClV. P. 12(b)(6): "How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for 
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensible party. A motion 
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if 
a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is 
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further 
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a 
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact 
to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense 
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a 
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claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT 
COURT. 
The Plaintiffs filed an action against various individuals, including Mr. Aviano, 
alleging various acts of fraud. As Plaintiffs action pertains to Mr. Aviano, Plaintiffs' 
basis for its allegations involves a single real estate purchase transaction. See, Court 
Record ("Rec"), 3055-3053, ffi[ 404-413. 
On October 20, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint. See generally, 
Rec, 461. After being served with various motions to dismiss pursuant to UTAH R. Civ. 
P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on November 27, 
2009. See generally, Rec at 2143. On February 19, 2010, the district court dismissed 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in its entirety with respect to Mr. Aviano, pursuant 
to, inter alia, UTAH R. CiV. P. 9(b). See, Rec. at 5009. However, the district court 
granted Plaintiffs leave to amend, provided Plaintiffs could do so in good faith and with 
particularity. See, Id. As a result, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint 
(which provides the basis for this appeal) on March 5, 2010, as well as lengthy Errata to 
the Second Amended Complaint on March 15, 2010 (collectively, "Second Amended 
Complaint"). See, Rec. at 4997, and 5048 (also attached as Exhibit "B" to Plaintiffs' 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum, on file herein). 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint also alleged various fraud-based causes of 
action against various individuals, including Mr. Aviano. However, with respect to Mr. 
Aviano, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges the following causes of action: 
(1) fraud and intentional misrepresentation; (2) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty; (3) aiding and abetting fraudulent non-disclosure; (4) negligent misrepresentation; 
(5) conspiracy; (6) and Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity ("UPUA"). See, Rec. at 2978, 
2953, 2947, 2945, 2926, and 2923. 
The Plaintiffs based the foregoing causes of action against Mr. Aviano on a single 
real estate purchase transaction between Mr. Aviano and The Preserve at Mapleton 
Company, LLC, wherein the Plaintiffs1 suffered absolutely no damage. See, Rec, 3055-
3053, t t 404-413. Specifically, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged that Mr. 
Aviano executed various closing documents evidencing the fact that Mr. Aviano 
purchased a certain parcel of real property for approximately $900,000.00. See, Id. at 
3054, fflj 408-409, 2964, | 800, and 2932, | 944. Additionally, the Second Amended 
Complaint alleged that the aforementioned closing documents represented that the 
Plaintiffs, as assignees of MagnetBank, would receive approximately $900,000.00 from 
the proceeds of the real estate purchase transaction. See, Id. at 3054, ^[409-410. 
Furthermore, the Second Amended Complaint expressly alleges that the Plaintiffs did, in 
fact, receive $900,000.00 from the proceeds of the real estate purchase transaction. See, 
l As successors in interest to MagnetBank. 
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Id. at If 410. &e also, Rec, 2964, f 802, and 2931, \ 946. 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Aviano moved to dismiss the above-referenced 
causes of action pursuant to, inter alia, UTAH R. Crv. P. 9(b). See generally, Rec, 5110. 
The district court once again dismissed all fraud-based causes of action with respect to 
Mr. Aviano, and did not give the Plaintiffs' a fifth opportunity to properly plead their 
claims. See, Rec, 5606 (also attached as Exhibit "C" to Plaintiffs' Addendum, on file 
herein). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS PERTAINING TO M R . AVIANO 
The Plaintiffs/Appellants address their factual allegations against Mr. Aviano in Yf 
53-55 of Appellants' Opening Brief on Appeal. Mr. Aviano provides the following 
additional statement of facts with respect to Plaintiffs' allegations against Mr. Aviano 
(which the district court held to be insufficient under UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b)). See 
generally, Rec, 5606: 
1. The Plaintiffs alleged "on information and belief that Mr. Aviano agreed 
to lend another named Defendant/Appellee, David Simpson ("Mr. Simpson"), 
$2,000,000.00. See, Rec, 3055, ^  405. 
2. The Plaintiffs further allege "on information and belief that as a condition 
of the alleged $2,000,000.00 loan, Mr. Simpson would cause The Preserve at Mapleton 
Company, LLC to sell Mr. Aviano a parcel of real property for $575,000.00. See, Id. at ^ 
2 Counting Plaintiffs' lengthy Errata as one attempt, in addition to the original complaint, 
the first amended complaint, and the second amended complaint. 
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405(a). 
3. Despite the foregoing allegations of a $575,000.00 purchase price, the 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Simpson and Mr. Aviano executed closing documents showing 
that Mr. Aviano would purchase the parcel of real property from The Preserve at 
Mapleton Company, LLC for approximately $900,000.00 (not $575,000.00). See, Rec, 
3054,1408. 
4. Moreover, the Plaintiffs allege that pursuant to the aforementioned closing 
documents, the Plaintiffs were to receive approximately $900,000.00 from the proceeds 
of the real estate purchase transaction described immediately above. See, Id. at 1409. 
5. Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that they did, in fact, receive approximately 
$900,000.00 from the proceeds of the above-described real estate purchase transaction. 
See, Rec, 3054, f 410, 2964, % 802, and 2931, f 946. 
6. Based upon the single real estate purchase transaction, described above, 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action against Mr. 
Aviano: (1) fraud and intentional misrepresentation; (2) aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty; (3) aiding and abetting fraudulent non-disclosure; (4) negligent 
misrepresentation; (5) conspiracy; (6) and UPUA. See, Rec, 2978, 2953, 2947, 2945, 
2926, and 2923. 
7. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims against Mr. 
Aviano, as well as Plaintiffs' UPUA to the extent Plaintiffs' UPUA claim was based on 
allegations of fraud, and did so "for failure to plead with particularity as required by Utah 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)...without leave to amend." See, Rec, 5605. However, the 
district court allowed the Plaintiffs to pursue their UPUA claim against Mr. Aviano to the 
extent "that claim is not based on allegations of fraud." See, Rec., 5604. 
8. The district court further dismissed Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims 
"for failure to state a claim under UTAH R. CiV. P. 12(b)(6)." See, Rec, 5604. In 
dismissing Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims, the district court held that "[t]he Utah 
Supreme Court has not yet recognized a claim for aiding and abetting under Utah law." 
See, Id. 
9. The district court did, however, deny Mr. Aviano's motion with respect to 
Plaintiffs' conspiracy cause of action "to the extent such claim is based on alleged 
breaches of fiduciary duties, which are not subject to the particularity requirements of 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b)." Additionally, the district court denied Mr. Aviano's motion to 
dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation cause of action, finding 
that said cause of action "is not subject to the particularity requirements of UTAH R. Civ. 
P. 9(b). See, Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b) requires the Plaintiffs to plead their fraudulent allegations 
against Mr. Aviano with particularity. However, with respect to Plaintiffs' allegations 
and causes of action against Mr. Aviano, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 
failed to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b). Even if 
Plaintiffs' allegations did satisfy the requirements of UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b), Plaintiffs' 
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causes of action, nevertheless, fail to state a claim against Mr. Aviano. Consequently, the 
district court was correct in dismissing any fraud-based cause of action alleged against 
Mr. Aviano, and the district court's ruling should be affirmed. 
Furthermore, although the Rules of Procedure tend to favor granting a party leave 
to amend its pleadings, "the matter remains in the sound discretion of the trial court." 
Westley, 663 P.2d at 94. A district court is well within its discretion to deny a party leave 
to amend its pleadings when doing so would cause unnecessary delay, and when the party 
seeking leave has had an adequate opportunity to properly draft its pleadings. See, Id. 
Consequently, under the circumstances of the present case, where the case had been 
pending for eight months and the Plaintiffs had already been given four opportunities to 
properly plead their allegations, the district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' 
fraud-based claims against Mr. Aviano without leave to amend. Consequently, the 
district court's ruling should be affirmed. 
Finally, under UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a defendant "admits the facts alleged in 
the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." Helf, 
2009 UT 11, | 14, 203 P.3d at 967. Because Utah does not recognize the aiding and 
abetting causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, the district 
court was also correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action, 
pursuant to UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, even if Utah did recognize Plaintiffs' 
aiding and abetting causes of action, in light of the Plaintiffs' allegations in connection 
with those causes of action, the district court was, nevertheless, correct in dismissing the 
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same pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), with respect to Mr. Aviano. Therefore, the 
district court's ruling should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PLEAD FRAUD WITH 
PARTICULARITY AGAINST MR. AVIANO. 
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake shall be stated with particularity." UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b)(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, "the Rule 9(b) requirement should not be understood as limited to 
allegations of common-law fraud...[I]t reachfes] all circumstances where the pleader 
alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term 
'fraud5 in its broadest dimension." Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 39 (alterations in 
original, citing Williams v. State Farm Ins, Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982). 
Moreover, "where fraud lies at the core of the action, Rule 9(b) applies...The 
requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to all cases where the gravamen of the claim is fraud 
even though the theory supporting the claim is not technically termed fraud." Coroles, 
supra (citing Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1985), and Adams v. NVR 
Homes, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 250 (D.Md. 2000)). Additionally, an allegation of fraud 
asserted upon "information and belief is only adequate under UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b) if 
such allegation "includes the facts upon which the belief is based." Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 
2003 UT App 85, % 24, 69 P.3d 286 (citing Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, 906 F. Supp. 
1470, 1476 (D.Utah 1994). However, conclusory and conjectural statements are 
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insufficient. Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, \ 39, 190 P.3d 1269. 
Even in light of Utah's liberal pleading rules, Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, nevertheless, fails to allege any fraud-based cause of action against Mr. 
Aviano with the particularity required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b). Consequently, the 
district court was correct in dismissing all such fraud-based causes of action with respect 
to Mr. Aviano. 
In order to state a claim for fraud, the Plaintiffs must have pleaded each of the 
following elements with particularity: 
(1) a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be 
false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby 
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
See, Maack v. Res. Design & Constr., 875 P.2d 570 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994), and Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996). As noted above, however, 
Plaintiffs' base their claims of fraud on a single real estate purchase transaction, whereby 
the Plaintiff, as an assignee of MagnetBank, suffered no damage. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
allege that Mr. Aviano executed various closing documents, evidencing the fact that Mr. 
Aviano purchased a certain parcel of real property for $900,000.00. See, Rec, 3054, ffl| 
408-409, 2964, j[ 800, and 2032, f 944. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the 
aforementioned closing documents represented that the Plaintiffs, as assignees of 
MagnetBank, would receive approximately $900,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of 
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the above-referenced parcel of real property, and that the Plaintiffs actually did receive 
approximately $900,000.00 from the proceeds thereof. See, Rec, 3054, ^ 410, 2964, f 
802, and 2931, f 946. Therefore, based upon the Plaintiffs' express allegations, Mr. 
Aviano is unable to see exactly how such a transaction can be deemed fraudulent when 
the representations that were made were actually true and fulfilled, and where Plaintiffs 
did not suffer any damage. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in an attempt to state a fraud-based claim against 
Mr. Aviano, the Plaintiffs make the confusing, unsubstantiated, and speculative 
conclusion that the aforementioned real estate transaction involved fraud because the 
sales price of the real property was allegedly only $575,000.00, rather than $900,000.00, 
despite what the aforementioned closing documents provided and despite the proceeds 
actually received by MagnetBank. See, Rec, 3055, f 405(a). Plaintiffs also allege an 
unsubstantiated conclusion that the difference of $325,000.00 ($900,000.00 -
$575,000.00 = $325,000.00) was paid to Plaintiffs by Mr. Simpson. See, Rec, 2964, \ 
802. Plaintiffs, however, provide no factual allegations in support of these speculative 
conclusions, not to mention failing to plead such factual allegations with any degree of 
particularity as required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b). Even if the Plaintiffs allegations 
concerning Mr. Simpson's alleged payment of a portion of the purchase price were true, 
Plaintiffs still fail to explain or allege exactly how those actions can be deemed 
fraudulent - especially in light of the fact that the Plaintiffs actually admit that they 
received the $900,000.00 represented in the closing documents. See, Rec, 3054, % 410. 
16 
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Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the district court was correct in dismissing 
Plaintiffs' fraud-based causes of action, including Plaintiffs' cause of action for 
intentional misrepresentation, with respect to Mr. Aviano. 
In addition to the foregoing, even if Plaintiffs' allegations against Mr. Aviano 
were sufficient under UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b), the district court was still correct in 
dismissing Plaintiffs' intentional misrepresentation claim against Mr. Aviano pursuant to 
the UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) portion of Mr. Aviano's Motion to Dismiss, as Plaintiffs 
have suffered no damages. Consequently, the district court's decision should still be 
affirmed. See, Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, | 18, 29 P.3d 1225 ("[A]n appellate 
court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated 
by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action.'"(citing Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Ass % 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969)(plurality opinion)). 
"[I]n ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all 
reasonable inferences in his favor." Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 
1055, 1058 (Utah 1991)(emphasis added). However, mere legal conclusions will not will 
not provide a sufficient basis to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as such conclusions 
"are stillborn for all purposes, when they are stated in the place of ultimate facts." 
Chesney v. Chesney, 94 P. 989, 992 (Utah 1903). In short, "[m]atters of substance, which 
are necessary to be alleged in a complaint, cannot be left out'' Id. at 993 (emphasis 
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added). Furthermore, the objective of Utah's liberal pleading rules "is to require that the 
essential facts upon which redress is sough be set forth with simplicity, brevity, clarity 
and certainty so that it can be determined whether there exists a legal basis for the relief 
claimed." Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 23 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, an essential element in pleading fraud is that of damages. See, 
Maack, 875 P.2d 570. While Plaintiffs alleged that their predecessor in interest, 
MagnetBank, "reasonably relied on the contents of the closing documents," See, Rec, 
2963, | 809, which provide that MagnetEJank was to receive approximately $900,000.00 
from the proceeds of the aforementioned real estate transaction, Plaintiffs also allege that 
MagnetBank actually did receive "just under $900,000.00" Id. at 3054, | 410, and 2964, 
\ 802. Simply stated, Plaintiffs allege that they relied on the closing documents, which 
represented that Plaintiffs would receive a certain sum of money, and Plaintiffs did, in 
fact, receive that certain sum of money, regardless of where that money came from. 
Therefore, by their own allegations, accepting such allegations as true for the purposes of 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs received exactly what they thought and agreed they 
would receive and, thus, have suffered no damage thereby. Consequently, Plaintiffs' 
fraud-based causes of action fail to state a claim against Mr. Aviano. Consequently, the 
district court was also correct in dismissing such claims against Mr. Aviano pursuant to 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
/// 
[ CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE ] 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS ALSO CORRECT IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT AGAIN. 
Although the Rules of Procedure tend to favor granting a party leave to amend its 
pleadings, "the matter remains in the sound discretion of the trial court." Westley, 663 
P.2d at 94. A district court is well within its discretion to deny a party leave to amend its 
pleadings when doing so would cause unnecessary delay, and when the party seeking 
leave has had an adequate opportunity to properly draft its pleadings. See, Id. 
Furthermore, Utah courts typically focus on three factors when considering whether to 
allow a party leave to amend its pleadings. See, Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 
UT App 44, 87 P.3d 734. First, "the timeliness of the motion." Id. at f 26. Second, "the 
justification given by the movant for the delay." Id. And finally, "the resulting prejudice 
to the responding party." Id. 
Under the circumstances of the present case, the district court was correct in not 
allowing the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. For example, after eight months, 
the Plaintiffs had already been allowed to amend their complaint four times prior to the 
district court's dismissal without leave to amend. For example, Plaintiffs filed their 
original complaint on October 20, 2009. See, Rec, 461. The Plaintiffs filed their First 
Amended Complaint on November 27, 2009, thus having their second chance to properly 
plead their claims. See, Rec, 2143. Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on 
March 5, 2010 (third chance), as well as lengthy Errata to the Second Amended 
Complaint on March 15, 2010 (fourth chance). See, Rec, 4997 and 5048. 
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Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' multiple attempts to properly plead their claims, the Plaintiffs 
still had failed to plead fraud with particularity against Mr. Aviano, as explained in 
greater detail, above. Consequently, the Plaintiffs caused at least eight months of delay, 
and sought to potentially cause even more delay by trying a fifth time to properly plead 
their causes of action. Therefore, because of the delay alone caused by the Plaintiffs, the 
district court was correct in not allowing Plaintiffs leave to amend their Second Amended 
Complaint. 
In addition to the foregoing, each time the Plaintiffs attempted to amend their 
pleadings, Mr. Aviano would necessarily expend a substantial amount of time, resources, 
and attorneys fees, in responding to Plaintiffs' inadequate pleadings. Moreover, the 
longer this case continued, the longer Mr. Aviano would be forced to conduct his life and 
his business under the constant stigma of being named as a defendant in a seemingly 
never-ending lawsuit. Consequently, Mr. Aviano, as well as many other named 
Defendants/Appellees, were being severely prejudiced, thus providing further 
justification for the district court's decision not to allow Plaintiffs leave to amend again. 
Based upon the foregoing, the district court was correct in its decision not to allow 
the Plaintiffs leave to amend their Second Amended Complaint. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT 
UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE AIDING AND ABETTING AS 
VALID CAUSES OF ACTION. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has not recognized civil causes of action for aiding and 
abetting. See, Coroles, 2003 UT App 339 at n. 19. Consequently, the district court was 
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correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action pursuant to UTAH R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Even if this Court were to recognize civil causes of action for aiding and abetting, 
the district court was still correct, on at least three separate grounds, in dismissing said 
causes of action with respect to Mr. Aviano. Either way, the district court's decision 
should be affirmed. See, Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ]f 18. 
First, because the only allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint 
against Mr. Aviano deal with the aforementioned real estate purchase transaction, and 
because Plaintiffs' attempted basis for such allegations against Mr. Aviano rest in fraud, 
and because Plaintiffs have failed to plead fraud with the requisite particularity against 
Mr. Aviano, Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims were also properly dismissed. See, 
Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 39 ("[W]here fraud lies at the core of the action, Rule 9(b) 
applies...The requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to all cases where the gravamen of the 
claim is fraud even though the theory supporting the claim is not technically termed 
fraud." (citing Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Or. 1985), and Adams v. NVR 
Homes, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 250 (D.Md. 2000)). Therefore, because the Plaintiffs 
generally failed to adequately plead fraud against Mr. Aviano, the district court was 
correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims (which used the same 
allegations as their basis) with respect to Mr. Aviano. 
Second, even if this Court were to recognize Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes 
of action, said causes of action must necessarily fail as "[w]e only hold that if this cause 
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of action is cognizable in Utah, it includes damages as an essential element." Coroles, 
2003 UT App 339 at n. 19 (emphasis added). As described in greater detail, above, even 
taking the Plaintiffs' allegations against Mr. Aviano as true, Plaintiffs suffered no damage 
as a result of any of Mr. Aviano's alleged actions. More particularly, the Plaintiffs allege 
that Mr. Aviano executed closing documents which stated that the Plaintiffs would 
receive approximately $900,000.00 from the proceeds of a certain real estate purchase 
transaction. See, Rec, 3054, fflf 408-409. Plaintiffs further allege that they relied on Mr. 
Aviano's representations made in said closing documents, and that the Plaintiffs actually 
received the approximately $900,000.00 which they were supposed to receive and which 
they expected to receive. See, Id. at f^ 410. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have suffered no 
damages as a result of any of Mr. Aviano's alleged actions. Without suffering damages, 
Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims (if valid) must necessarily fail. Therefore, the 
district court was correct in dismissing the same with respect to Mr. Aviano. 
Finally, even if this Court were to recognize Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims 
as being valid, Plaintiffs' claims, nevertheless, fail to state a claim against Mr. Aviano 
and, therefore, the district court was correct in dismissing the same with respect to Mr. 
Aviano. Specifically, this Court has held that "the gravamen of the claim [of aiding and 
abetting...] is the defendant's knowing participation." Russell/Packard Development, 
Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316,1j 33 78 P.3d 616 (emphasis added)(internal quotations 
omitted, alterations in original)(citing Future Group, II v. NationsBank, 478 S.E.2d 45 
(S.C. 1996). See also, Restatement (Second) Torts, § 874. However, nowhere in 
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Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint does the Plaintiff allege, that Mr. Aviano knew 
that Mr. Simpson allegedly owed the Plaintiffs any type of fiduciary duty (or that Mr. 
Aviano knew that he was allegedly helping Mr. Simpson to breach his fiduciary duty 
owed to the Plaintiffs). Nor does the Second Amended Complaint allege (especially with 
any particularity as required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b)) that Mr. Aviano knew that Mr. 
Simpson was allegedly perpetrating a fraud upon the Plaintiffs, or that Mr. Aviano's 
arms-length purchase of real property wherein the Plaintiffs suffered no damages, was a 
part of Mr. Simpson's alleged fraud. 
Without any allegation, or at the very least a reasonable presumption, of Mr. 
Aviano's scienter with respect to the Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action, 
Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action fail to state a claim against Mr. Aviano. 
Consequently, the district court was correct in dismissing the same with respect to Mr. 
Aviano. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with 
the particularity required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b) in their Second Amended Compalint, 
with respect to Mr. Aviano. Even if Plaintiffs had properly plead their fraud-based cause 
of action against Mr. Aviano with particularity, Plaintiffs' claims, nevertheless, failed to 
state a claim against Mr. Aviano. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims against Mr. Aviano was proper. Therefore, Mr. Aviano 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's ruling as it pertains to Mr. 
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Aviano. 
Furthermore, based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, including the 
fact that Plaintiffs previously had four opportunities to amend their complaint, as well as 
the resulting prejudice and delay suffered by Mr. Aviano and the other 
Defendants/Appellees, the district court was correct in refusing Plaintiffs leave to amend 
their Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, Mr. Aviano respectfully requests this 
Court to affirm the district court's ruling as it pertains to Mr. Aviano. 
Finally, because Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims are not recognized causes of 
action in Utah, the district court was correct in dismissing the same. Even if Plaintiffs' 
aiding and abetting claims were validly recognized causes of action, Plaintiffs' claims, 
nevertheless, failed to state a claim against Mr. Aviano. Therefore, Mr. Aviano 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's ruling as it pertains to Mr. 
Aviano. 
DATED this day of _ ^KaACJA ,2011. 
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C. 
)DY 
MORGAN L. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, 
Michael Aviano 
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UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(ll) STATEMENT 
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l 1), no addendum is necessary. 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing MICHAEL 
AVIANO'S APPELLEE'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on 
this 7\<£ day of ^[AJQU U4_ > 2 0 1 ^ t o t h e following: 
Bart J. Bailey 
William T. Jennings 
BAILEY & JENNINGS 
Troon Park, 584 South State Street 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Chris D. Greenwood 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
1840 North State Street, Ste. 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Craig Carlile 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
86 North University Avenue, Ste. 430 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Jonathan L. Jaussi 
FREEDOM LEGAL 
P.O. Box 460 
Payson, Utah 84651 
Julian D. Jensen 
311 South State Street, Ste. 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Steven R. Sumsion 
SUMSION MACDONALD 
86 North University Avenue, Ste. 400 
Provo, Utah 84601 
y(WcLWjSiV 
Cummings 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
